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UNTAMED TRIBUNAL? OF DYNAMIC
INTERPRETATION AND PURPOSE CLAUSES
SARA SLINNt
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a story about legislative frustration and administrative
resistance. It is the story of a legislature that created a labour
relations tribunal, instilled it with broad powers-even drawing
away some jurisdiction from the courts-and charged it with using
its own expertise to manage all aspects of labour relations. It is the
story of a legislature that then changed its mind, and of successive
governments seeking to rein in the tribunal's decision making. The
means chosen by these governments to exercise control was a series
of increasingly restrictive changes to the purpose clause in the
tribunal's governing legislation. However, the legislature's own
creation, once set free, has resisted being called to heel. Although
this is the tale of the experience of the British Columbia Labour
Relations Board ("Board") and the purpose clause in B.C. labour
legislation, it is really a story that plays out between many
administrative tribunals and the state as they negotiate the
boundaries of administrative independence and control.1
Part II of this article examines Board case law to assess whether
the amendments to the purpose clause have influenced the Board's
decision making.2 This study concludes that the new purpose clause
did not appear to influence the Board's decisions in a new direction
and did not reorient labour relations, as had been widely anticipated
at the time of the amendments. Instead, the Board has interpreted the
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I acknowledge with thanks the
helpful comments of two anonymous reviewers and the able research assistance
of Scott Cooper and Chantalle Fish.
Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244 [Code].
2 Case law is reviewed from the passage of the Purpose Clause in 2002 to the end
of 2008.
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amended purpose clause in a manner that supports and reinforces the
traditional structure and balance of labour relations.
Given the government's strong statements about its intentions in
amending the purpose clause and converting it to a duties provision,
and the history of expressed governmental and legislative
dissatisfaction with the Board's application of the purpose clause in
the past, this leads to the question of how the Board's response is to
be characterized.
Is this a tribunal resisting yet again the legislature's expressed
will and direction? Or is it something else? Although the Board may
not be (and if we accept governments' past criticisms, has not been)
interpreting and applying the purpose clause as the legislature
intended, it does not follow that the Board is a 'rogue,' acting
inappropriately or improperly resisting the direction of the
legislature and its legislation. Is it instead, as some legislative and
administrative scholars might argue, an example of an administrative
tribunal exercising its appropriate role and discretion in discharging
its responsibilities, given labour boards' independence and the
distinctive nature of tribunal decision making and administrative
legislation? Is it, indeed, a rogue board and an example of ineffective
political control over an agency? Alternatively, is it an example of
dynamic statutory interpretation by a tribunal fulfilling its role, and
reflecting its own narrative, history, and understanding of the
statute?
Part III of this article addresses these questions. In doing so, it
looks to the role and decision making of tribunals such as the Board,
and interpretive and legislative theory. It then examines the role of
purpose clauses, both generally and within administrative decision
making.
II. THE PURPOSE CLAUSE AND THE BOARD
A purpose clause was introduced into B.C. labour legislation in
1973, with the passage of the province's first comprehensive,
modem labour statute.3 British Columbians had elected the social
democratic New Democratic Party ("NDP") in 1972, after two
decades of conservative Social Credit ("Socred") governments. The
NDP's key election promise was to build more peaceful and




constructive labour relations, ending years of labour-management
turmoil in the province. The Socred opposition supported this
promise both in principle and in the legislature.4
Against this backdrop of a cooperative political effort to improve
labour relations in the province and, particularly, to calm labour
unrest, labour relations legislation was substantially reformed and
the Board was restructured. The new 1973 Code contained many
innovative elements and its primary goal was to make the collective
bargaining process work successfully and to achieve effective
industrial relations by allowing the Board to become involved in the
"total process" of labour relations.
5
British Columbia embraced the spirit and recommendations of
the 1969 Woods Task Force Report with its 1973 Code.6 One
recommendation taken up was to broaden the labour board's
jurisdiction to include all facets of labour disputes.7 The Board's
authority was expanded to cover the full spectrum of labour relations
issues, and it was conceived of as an independent, expert body
expected to use the experience and judgment of its members to
manage labour relations, with the mission of establishing more
constructive labour relations in the province. In order for the Board
to discharge its newly broadened responsibilities, the Legislature
granted it a great deal of autonomy and power, much of which had
previously been within the jurisdiction of the courts. A separate part
of the 1973 Code set out the Board's structure, functions, and
jurisdiction, and included a purpose clause.8
The purpose clause was not intended to restrict the discretion or
flexibility of the Board in its decision making.9 On the contrary, in
4 Paul C. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour
Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) at 3.
5 1973 Code, supra note 3; British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official
Report of Debates (Hansard) (1 June 1987) at 1489 (Hon. Mr. Hanson) [Hansard
(1 June 1987)].
6 Canadian Industrial Relations-The Report of the Task Force on Labour
Relations (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968).
7 Ibid. at 207-208.
8 1973 Code, supra note 3; Hansard(I June 1987), supra note 5 at 1489.
9 1973 Code, supra note 3. S. 27(1) provided: "The board may exercise the powers
and shall perform the duties conferred or imposed upon it under this Act with the
object of securing and maintaining industrial peace and promoting conditions
favourable to settlement of disputes ......
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the interests of allowing the Board flexibility, it provided that the
Board was not bound by the general policies it formulated and
permitted it to seek submissions from other persons when
formulating general policies. 10 The purpose clause provided that the
Board "may exercise the powers and shall perform the duties" given
to it under the 1973 Code, and identified two objectives to be met by
the Board in exercising its powers and performing its duties:
securing and maintaining industrial peace, and promoting conditions
favourable to settlement of disputes. Nevertheless, few Board
decisions paid explicit attention to the purpose clause.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PURPOSE CLAUSE
1. EARLY EVOLUTION
Over the course of numerous amendments (in 1977, 1987, 1992, and
most recently in 2002) the legislature's use of this provision
evolved. 1 Evident throughout is the government and opposition's
apparent recognition of the potential importance of the purpose
clause in influencing the Board's policy and decision making and,
therefore, labour relations in the province. 12
10 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard)
(24 October 1973) at 917 (Hon. Mr. King); see 1973 Code, supra note 3, ss.
27(l)-(2).
11 Labour Code ofBritish Columbia Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1977, c. 72, s. 5 [1977
Code]; Industrial Relations Reform Act, S.B.C. 1987, c. 24, s. 18 [1987 IRA];
Labour Relations Code, S.B.C. 1992, c. 82, s. 2 [1992 Code]; Labour Relations
Code Amendment Act, 2002, S.B.C. 2002, c. 47, s. 1 [2002 Amendment Act].
12 In 1977 the Socred government amended the purpose clause (1977 Code, ibid.).
The government stated that, with these amendments, it intended that the Labour
Code would serve the public interest, that labour legislation was not the "private
preserve" of unions and employers, and that the amended purpose clause would
make it clear that the public interest would have primacy over the private
interests of the parties in labour relations (British Columbia, Legislative
Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), (9 September 1977) at 5357-
5358 (Hon. Mr. Williams)).
In 1987, the Socred government contended that its widespread changes to labour
legislation, including the purpose clause, would create industrial relations
stability (1987 IRA, ibid.). In particular, introducing the purpose of minimizing
harmful effects of labour disputes on third parties was necessary because "[F]or
too long organized labour has held the innocent third party to ransom in many a
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In 1992 the NDP government substantially amended the purpose
clause. Following the recommendations of a subcommittee of special
advisors on labour law reform, the purpose clause was relocated to
the beginning of the statute (from section 27 to section 2) to
emphasize its role as providing the legislation's "governing
principles", 3 and reworded to reflect, and provide the foundation
for, substantive changes to other parts of the statute. 14
Brent Mullin described these amendments as a profound change
from the process-orientation of earlier labour relations, recognizing
that the challenges of the new economy demanded that the Board
and government become more involved in ensuring that parties reach
community across this province" (Hansard(l June 1987), supra note 5 at 1485-
1486 (Mr. Hewitt)).
The NDP opposition was concerned that emphasizing the public interest would
mean that the interests of others would be preferred over those members of the
public in labour (British Columbia, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative
Assembly (Hansard) (2 June 1987) at 1502 (Mr. Lovick)). It also charged that the
change in purpose from fostering harmonious relations between "employers and
unions", to "employers and employees" signaled the government's fundamental
rejection of labour relations and demonstrated its intention to deunionize the
province (Hansard(1 June 1987), supra note 5 at 1481-1482 (Mr. Gabelmann)).
It argued that the amended purpose clause meant that rights of individuals would
be treated as paramount to good industrial relations (ibid. at 1496 (Mr.
Gabelmann)), and signaled the government's intention to use the statute to rid the
province of organized labour (ibid. at 1487 (Mr. Lovick)). Generally, the
opposition charged that the Government was trying to legislate a competitive
economy and consensus in industrial relations, and to increase state intervention
in labour relations (ibid. at 1484 (Mr. Clark)).
13 British Columbia Labour Relations Review Committee, Report of the Sub-
committee of Special Advisors (Vancouver: The Committee, 1992) at 18.
14 Ibid. 1992 Code, supra note 11, s. 2 provided:
(1) The following are the purposes of this Code:
(a) to encourage the practice and procedures of collective bargaining between
employers and trade-unions as the freely chosen representatives of employees;
(b) to encourage cooperative participation between employers and trade unions in
resolving workplace issues, adapting to changes in the economy, developing
workforce skills and promoting workplace productivity;
(c) to minimize the effects of labour disputes on persons who are not involved in
the dispute;
(d) to promote conditions favourable to the orderly, constructive and expeditious
settlement of disputes between employers and trade unions;
(e) to ensure that the public interest is protecting during labour disputes;
(f) to encourage the use of mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism.
(2) The board shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred or imposed on
it under this Code having regard to the purposes set out in subsection (1).
2009
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desirable labour relations outcomes, 15 and as a change from a one-
dimensional focus on redistribution and counter-balancing employer
power towards recognition of the need to promote productivity. 6
Mullin described this as "a fundamental shift in the most basic,
underlying purposes of the Code."'7 However, Mullin later
concluded that the Board ignored these changes in all but a few
isolated cases.18
2. PURPOSES TO DUTIES
In the 2001 election, the neo-conservative B.C. Liberal party gained
power with a tremendous majority, capturing 77 of 79 seats in the
legislature. 9 Labour relations reform was high on this powerful new
government's agenda, and among the extensive amendments to the
Code passed the following year were substantial changes to the
purpose clause.20
Among the most controversial-and anticipated to be the most
significant-of these changes were amendments to the introductory
portion of Section 2, re-titling it a "duties" clause, binding both the
Board, and "other persons who exercise powers and perform duties
under this Code." The Minister of Labour emphasised that, with this
change, the government intended to oblige the Board to consider the
principles set out in Section 2 in all cases, and sought to ensure this
15 Brent Mullin, Towards a Progressive Labour Relations Board (1998)
[unpublished, archived in author's files] at 13 [Mullin, "Towards"]. Brent Mullin
served as a Vice-Chair of the Board from 1992 to 1998, returning to private
practice until January 2002 when he was appointed as Board Chair. In August
2002 Mullin was also appointed Chair of the B.C. Employment Standards
Tribunal.
16 Ibid.; Brent Mullin, Towards a Progressive Labour Relations Board-Part III
[unpublished, archived in author's files] at 7 [Mullin, "Part III"].
17 Mullin, "Part III", ibid. at 7.
18 Ibid. at 8.
19 The remaining two seats went to the NDP: Elections BC, "Summary of Results
By Political Party: 37th General Election-May 16, 2001" (2001), online:
Elections BC <http://www.elections.bc.ca/elections/sov01/polpart.htm>.
20 2002 Amendment Act, supra note 11, s. 1. In the remainder of this article "Section




by recasting the purpose clause as a duty. 2 1 The Minister explained
that this was necessary to counter what the government viewed as
the Board's failure to apply the existing purpose clause with
sufficient rigour. In the government's view, the Board had simply
used the Section 2 purpose clause as a guideline and a policy tool,
rather than as a substantive part of the Code which the Board was
required to consider.22
Six of the eight purposes enumerated following the introduction
appeared in much the same form in the 1992 purpose clause:
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
between employers and trade unions as the freely chosen
representatives of employees; minimizing the effects of labour
disputes on persons who are not involved in those disputes; ensuring
protection of the public interest during labour disputes; and,
encouraging the use of mediation as a dispute resolution
mechanism.23 The new subsection 2(d) is a slight modification of the
earlier "cooperative participation" provision, substituting the phrase
"developing a workplace that promotes productivity" rather than
"promoting workplace productivity". Similarly, subsection 2(e) is
broader than its predecessor, by encouraging "settlement of
disputes", rather than specifying "disputes between employers and
trade unions".
Two new purposes (or principles) were added: a duty to
recognize the rights and obligations of employees (as well as
employers and trade unions), and to foster the employment of
workers in economically viable businesses.24 The Minister of Labour
explained this reference to employees was introduced because
employees are affected by board decisions, and recognizing
employee rights would ensure the balance that is necessary in labour
relations. 25 He also stated that the second new purpose "will provide
greater protection for [employees] by ensuring that job security and
21 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard),
Vol. 8, No. 1 (15 May 2002) at 3508 (Hon. Mr. Bruce) [Hansard (15 May
2002)].
22 Ibid.
23 Code, supra note 1, as am. by 2002 Amendment Act, supra note 11, s. 1.
24 Ibid., ss. 2(a)-(b).
25 Hansard (15 May 2002), supra note 21.
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viability of the business are considered in [Board] decisions",2 6 and
emphasised that economically viable businesses are necessary for
jobs to exist, pointing out that "[l]abour relations is sometimes said
to be about sharing the pie, but of course first you need a pie to
share. 27
In short, the purpose clause has long been the focus of legislative
interest and change in B.C.'s labour legislation, with successive
governments complaining that the Board has ignored, or not
implemented, the purpose clause in the manner intended by the
legislature.
Following the 2002 amendments, the Purpose Clause reads as
follows:
Duties under this Code
2. The board and other persons who exercise powers and perform
duties under this Code must exercise the powers and perform the
duties in a manner that
(a) recognizes the rights and obligations of employees,
employers and trade unions under this Code,
(b) fosters the employment of workers in economically viable
businesses,
(c) encourages the practice and procedures of collective
bargaining between employers and trade unions as the freely
chosen representatives of employees,
(d) encourages cooperative participation between employers and
trade unions in resolving workplace issues, adapting to changes
in the economy, developing workforce skills and developing a
workforce that promotes productivity,
(e) promotes conditions favourable to the orderly, constructive
and expeditious settlement of disputes,
(f) minimizes the effects of labour disputes on persons who are
not involved in those disputes,
(g) ensures that the public interest is protected during labour
disputes, and
26 British Columbia Ministry of Skills, Development and Labour, News Release
2002SDL0003-000049 "Labour Code Improved to Help Revitalize Economy"
(13 May 2002), online: Government of British Columbia
<www2.news.gov.bc.ca/archive/2001-2005/2002SDL0003-000049.htm>.
27 Hansard(15 May 2002), supra note 21 at 3508 (Hon. Mr. Bruce).
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(h) encourages the use of mediation as a dispute resolution
mechanism. 28
3. THE PURPOSE IN OUR BEGINNINGS
Canadian labour legislation draws heavily on the United States'
1935 National Labor Relations Act, or WagnerAct, which enhanced
the power of trade unions by providing legal protection to unions
chosen by workers as their bargaining representatives. 29 The NLRA
was a product of organized labour's political power and President
Roosevelt's determination to harness economic forces to combat the
Great Depression. 30 The first section of the NLRA, entitled "Findings
and Policies", is effectively a purpose clause, which explained that
the act was a response to the harm caused to commerce by industrial
unrest, including employers' refusals to recognise unions. This
clause also declared the following to be the policy of the United
States:
[T]o eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstruction to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate those
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
31
Canadian labour statutes have adopted several of the objectives
identified in this provision. Foremost among these are redistributing
power towards unions and workers, fostering collective rights, and a
process-orientation focusing on establishing a functioning union-
employer relationship.32
28 Code, supra note 1, s. 2.
29 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935) [NLRA]; George W. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2d
ed., looseleaf (Aurora, ON.: Canada Law Book, 1993) at para. 1:220 [Adams,
Labour Law].
30 Charles 0. Gregory, Labor and the Law, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1961) at
229-230.
31 NLRA, supra note 29, § 151.
32 Karl Klare considered the "Findings and Policy" along with case law and
literature to identify the following as the main objects of the Wagner Act:
promoting industrial peace, collective bargaining, bargaining power, free choice,
2009
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(a) Rebalancing Power & Collective Rights
One goal of the NLRA, and laws modelled on it, is redistributing
power to increase labour's strength as a counterbalance to
employers' power. As the "Findings and Policies" provision
describes, the act was posed primarily as an economic tool to
generate purchasing power and inflation to counteract the
deflationary effect of depression by enabling trade unions to improve
terms and conditions of work through their collective bargaining
power. 33 A necessary companion objective is promoting collective
rights and representation.
Reflecting on two decades of labour decisions in Ontario, George
Adams contended that clear legislative change would be needed to
shift the allocation of bargaining power reflected in existing labour
law, and speculated that modifying the purpose clause of labour
statutes could be a means for doing so.
31
(b) Process-Orientation
A key feature of the labour relations system is its process-
orientation, meaning that it is primarily concerned with establishing
lasting collective bargaining relationships between labour and
management, rather than with directing a particular labour relations
outcome. 35 Although state intervention exists through procedures
such as compulsory conciliation and binding arbitration, even these
procedures are still fundamentally process-orientated and meant to
encourage parties to resolve disputes-not determine the terms of
consumption, and industrial democracy (Karl E. Kare, "Judicial Deradicalization
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941"
(1978) 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 at 281-84).
33 Gregory, supra note 30 at 225, 343.
This may have been a pragmatic choice to make passage of the highly contested
WagnerAct possible, rather than reflecting the true intention of the Act's framers
(see James Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board: A Study in
Economics, Politics, and the Law, 1933-193 7 (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1974) at 144-147).
34 George W. Adams, "Towards a New Vitality: Reflections on 20 Years of
Collective Bargaining Regulation" (1991) 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 139 at 170, n. 102
[Adams, "New Vitality"].
35 American Bar Association, Committee on International Labor Law, Labor
Relations Law of Canada, ed. by Richard Lyon Martin (Washington: The Bureau
of National Affairs, 1977) at 57-58.
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resolution. This orientation regards free collective bargaining as
preferable to a system of government-directed labour relations
outcomes because it can reflect the particular needs and
characteristics of individual workplaces and workforces, and respond
to concerns for freedom of contract, competitive markets, and
private property.3 6 Consequently, proponents argue, it is the best
instrument of labour regulation for distributive issues.37 As Adams
points out, this system is not only concerned with distributive issues,
but also with the market. However, Adams notes that a weakness of
process-oriented systems is that they do not offset power imbalances
between parties, even when it might be desirable to do so.3 8 Another
commentator, Mullin, contends that the process-oriented approach
no longer functions with the challenges of the new economy. He
argues that a more hands-on approach to labour relations is needed,
and that a labour board should not simply be a "spectator to the final
outcome" but should rather be a "catalyst" helping parties to achieve
desirable outcomes.39
B. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS
Labour was greatly concerned that recasting Section 2 as a duties
clause and expanding its application would substantially affect the
balance of power between unions and management, as well as
affecting existing understandings of collective rights and the Board's
non-interventionist and process-oriented approach to dealing with
matters before it. Similarly, the newly-added purposes (subsections
2(a) and (b)) had the potential to alter the rights available under the
Code as well as the Board's traditionally non-interventionist and
process-oriented approach to disputes and issues.
1. DUTIES & OTHER PERSONS
First, converting the Code's purposes into "duties" which the Board
must consider in all cases had the potential to alter the Board's role,
possibly shifting its focus from a process-orientation towards an
outcome-orientation, reducing the degree of self-governance in
36 Adams, "New Vitality", supra note 34 at 145.
37 Ibid. at 145-146.
38 Ibid. at 149-150.
39 Mullin, "Towards", supra note 15 at 13 [footnotes omitted].
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labour-management relationships, leading to greater Board
participation and direction in matters that unions and employers had
previously worked out themselves, such as negotiations and labour
disputes. Some commentators warned that it could also to lead to
unprecedented government intervention in Board and arbitral
decision making and in the internal affairs of unions, with the object
of enhancing businesses' economic viability.
40
Mullin, arguing in favour of a duties clause, contended that it
would produce a "new dynamic" in labour relations in which
employers and unions would be required to demonstrate to the Board
how their own positions would further those Section 2 duties
reflecting the concerns and interests of the other party:
For the employer, that would be how what it was advocating would
further the objectives of the Code reflected in job security,
retraining, and ultimately better terms and conditions of
employment for the employees. For the union, it would be how its
position would assist the enterprise in adapting to the changes in the
economy through greater productivity, competitiveness, and
ultimately reinvestment as a result of the profitability and success of
the business.41
Requiring the union to adapt its positions in accordance with
employer concerns and interests could seriously compromise unions'
ability to represent members and alter the balance of power between
labour and management.
Further, the new requirement that not only the Board, but "all
other persons" exercising powers and performing duties under the
Code, must adhere to the purpose clause was expected to apply to all
decision-makers under the Code, such as arbitrators, settlement
officers, and industrial inquiry commissioners. Of even greater
concern, was whether it would extend to unions and employers.42
Given the broad definition and interpretation of the definition of
40 Code, supra note 1, ss. 2(b), (f), (g); "Commentary on the Labour Relations Code
Amendment Act, 2002 ("Bill 42")" (2002), online: Hastings Labour Law Office
<http://www.labourlawoffice.com/misc/Bill%2042%20Commentary.htm>
["Commentary"].
41 Note that Mullin was making this argument about a predecessor purpose clause
and the effect of s. 2(2), which is now the introductory part of s. 2 (Mullin, "Part
II", supra note 16 at 20-21).
42 "Commentary", supra note 40.
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"person" in the Code, it would be surprising if Section 2 did not
include unions and employers.43
Commentators suggested that requiring unions to exercise their
statutory powers in harmony with the Section 2 duties could oblige
unions to collectively bargain in a manner that "fosters the
employment of workers in economically viable businesses," as
subsection 2(b) requires. Meanwhile, unions engaged in striking and
picketing would be required to do so in a manner that "minimizes the
effects" on third parties and "ensures that the public interest is
protected", as subsections 2(f) and (g) demand." Not only could this
seriously affect unions' ability to represent their members, but it
could lead to "state intervention in collective bargaining and internal
union affairs and a very substantial change in the Board's approach"
to other Code provisions.45
Finally, these changes also had the potential to give new
emphasis to existing purposes such as: encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining; minimizing the effects of labour
disputes on third parties; protection of the public interest; and,
encouraging mediation. It could also emphasize the modified
purposes: developing workplaces that promote productivity; and,
encouraging settlement of disputes.46 Several of these purposes,
primarily the protection of third parties and the public interest, had
the potential to affect the Board's treatment of labour disputes,
particularly strikes, picketing, and leafleting, as well as bargaining,
in a manner favouring employer interests. This could have
tremendous implications for the location of the balance of power
between employers and unions, and for collective rights under the
Code.
2. INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS: SUBSECTION 2(A)
One newly introduced principle was the requirement that the rights
and obligations of employees, as well as those of employers and
43 S. 1 of the Code, supra note 1, defines "person" such that it
includes an employee, an employer, an employers' organization, a trade union and
council of trade unions, but does not include a person in respect of whom collective
bargaining is regulated by the Canada Labour Code[.]
44 Ibid., ss. 2(b), (f), (g).
45 "Commentary", supra note 40.
46 Code, supra note 1, ss. 2(c)-(h).
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unions, be considered.47 Collective and individual rights and
interests conflict at many junctures in labour relations, particularly
with respect to unionization, collective bargaining, and the duty of
fair representation. Explicitly including employee rights had the
potential to shift the balance of power towards individuals and the
employer at the expense of collective rights and unions. Such effects
would not be without precedent. Notably, an amendment to the
NLRA's purpose clause expressly recognizing individual rights
provided a foundation for an anti-union shift in labour jurisprudence
in the U.S.48
3. FOSTERING EMPLOYMENT IN ECONOMICALLY VIABLE
BUSINESSES: SUBSECTION 2(B)
The addition of fostering employment of workers in economically
viable businesses to the enumerated Code purposes was highly
contentious.49 Focusing on the term "economically viable
businesses", critics warned that this could be the most significant of
the changes to Section 2 because of the effect it could have on the
Board's approach to many other substantive Code provisions.50 It
could shift the balance of power in favour of employers51 and
encourage Board intervention in unionization, collective bargaining,
and labour disputes. It could also affect treatment of collective
bargaining, strikes, and picketing. Critics also suggested that use of
47 Ibid., s. 2(a).
48 This aspect of the Wagner Act was weakened when the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments redrafted the "Findings and Policy" provision to emphasise
individual employee rights and identify some union practices as hindering
commerce (Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,29 U.S.C. § 141 (1947) at §
141 (1)(b)). James Gross contends that these changes allowed Republican-
dominated panels of the National Labour Relations Board to interpret the
declaration of policy to give individual rights equal or greater priority over
collective rights and, thereby, justify anti-collective bargaining and anti-union
policies (James A. Gross, "Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty
Years of NLRB Law Making" (1985) 39 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 7 at 13; James
A. Gross, "The Demise of the National Labor Policy: A Question of Social
Justice" in Sheldon Friedman et al., eds., Restoring the Promise of American
Labor Law (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1994) 45 at 46-47).
49 Code, supra note 1, s. 2(b).




the term "viable" would require the Board to make inappropriate
international comparisons as opposed to intra-provincial
comparisons of business competitiveness.5 2 Commentators also
raised concerns that the Board's lack of expertise in determining the
viability of businesses could lead to faulty decisions as well as
lengthy hearings necessitating expert evidence to determine the
question of economic viability. 53 Finally, this could also encourage
the Board towards outcome-oriented decisions focusing on the
effects on business viability.
C. ASSESSING EFFECTS
The government clearly suggested that these changes were a
response to longstanding frustration with the Board's disregard for
the purpose clause. So, the question becomes: did the legislature
succeed in its apparent effort to rein in this rogue Board? To address
this question, this Part examines Board decisions from the passage of
the Purpose Clause in 2002 to the end of 2008. It begins by outlining
the new analytic framework introduced in the new Purpose Clause,
addresses the interpretation the Board has given to "duties" and
"other persons", and then reviews the interpretation of the two newly
introduced purposes. Then, reflecting the necessary interplay among
particular duties, the law relating to key stages of labour-
management relationships are considered. This Part concludes by
assessing whether the Purpose Clause has modified the three key
dimensions of the labour relations system addressed earlier: the
balance of power, collective rights, and the traditionally process-
rather than outcome-orientation of labour regulation.
1. NEW ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
An early Board decision declared that the Purpose Clause had
created a new analytical framework for Board decisions and for
fostering labour relations: that the Board would approach the
Purpose Clause by reading it as a whole, and together with other
substantive provisions of the Code, treating it as a "comprehensive
52 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard),
Vol. 8, No. 6 (28 May 2002) at 3642 (Ms. MacPhail).
53 They further cautioned that this lack of expertise may lead to lengthy hearings
involving expert evidence to determine the question of economic viability
("Commentary", supra note 40, n. 1).
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roadmap ... proceeding from the rights and obligations of the
parties, to an identification of the goals to be obtained" to the
application and interpretation of the Code. 54 The following passage
has come to be known as setting out this new analytic framework:
Section 2 sets out a vision of labour relations which: describes the
goals of the system to the immediate parties; places those goals
within a larger, societal context; and emphasizes the mechanisms by
which to proceed towards those goals (i.e., the "cooperative
participation" of(d) and the mediative approach emphasized in (h)).
Subsection 2(a) recognizes the rights and obligations of the three
immediate parties to labour relations: the employees, employers,
and trade unions. Subsection 2(b) then identifies the goal of
ensuring that the labour relations system fosters or encourages the
employment of workers in economically viable businesses.
Building on that base, subsection 2(c) confirms the critical franchise
under which employees in the Code can freely choose to be
represented by a union.
Once unionization has been chosen by the employees, subsection
2(d) addresses the Code's preference as to how the employer and the
union are to meet the challenges they face. [cooperative
participation, adapting to economic changes, developing workforce
skills and promoting productivity] ...
The subsections then proceed to: emphasize the need for "orderly,
constructive and expeditious settlement of disputes" (subsection
2(e)); place all of these matters within the larger public interest
(subsections 2(f) and 2(g)); and, lastly, encourage mediation as a
dispute resolution mechanism in labour relations (subsection 2(h)).s5
The Board has also held that the judgment of the legislature, as
reflected in its changes to Section 2, is that modem labour relations
require more than "simply promoting structures which are based on
an adversarial relationship", declaring that the "essence" of the
54 Juddand CE.P., Local 2000, BCLRB Decision No. B63/2003 at paras. 18-23,
91 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 33 [Judd]. This framework was applied in Judd, BCLRB
Decision No. B130/2003, [2003] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 130 (QL), and upheld in
BCLRB Decision No. B357/2003, [2003] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 357 (QL).
55 Judd, ibid. at para. 23.
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Purpose Clause reflects two concepts: the need to be competitive and
to work together.56
2. DUTIES & OTHER PERSONS
Though Section 2 states that its duties apply to "other persons who
exercise powers and perform duties under the Code", subsequent
Board decisions suggest that the scope and effect of these changes
are not as significant as some had anticipated. It does not appear that
Mullin's prediction of a "new dynamic" has come to pass, where
parties are compelled to address the other side's interests and
demonstrate that their own positions would advance the purposes in
Section 2. 5' The Board has shown little enthusiasm for applying
duties directly to employers, unions, or individual employees.
Instead, the Board seems to prefer to locate central responsibility for
the Purpose Clause on itself, while stating that the parties bear
indirect responsibility for realizing the goals of Section 2.58
The Board has identified two possible conceptions of "other
persons" falling within Section 2, preferring the narrower of the two
possible interpretations, limiting application of the Purpose Clause to
the Board, its Chair, Vice-Chairs, Members, Mediators, Board
employees, and other decision-makers such as arbitrators whose
authority arises from the Code.59 The Board noted that the legislative
record supports this narrower characterization of the duty,6° and that
this amendment was aimed at decision-makers:
56 Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. Partnership and BC-NHLPA, BCLRB Decision No.
B172/2007 at paras. 54-56, 144 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 219 [Orca Bay] (leave for
reconsideration of BCLRB Decision No. B 138/2006, 124 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 173).
57 See Mullin, "Part III", supra note 16 at 20-21.
58 Health Employers 'Ass 'n of British Columbia andHE. U., BCLRB Decision No
B415/2003 at paras. 77-80, 102 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 101 [HEABC Original
Decision] (original decision set aside on reconsideration: BCLRB Decision No.
B393/2004, 109 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 28 [HEABC Reconsideration]).
59 HEABC Original Decision, ibid. at paras. 53-54, 70, 72. Although employers or
unions have argued in several subsequent cases that the Purpose Clause properly
extends to parties, the Board has not explicitly addressed or decided the question
(See e.g. Lender Services Ltd. andB. C.G.E. U., BCLRB Decision No. B 165/2006,
126 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 114; Western Rubber Products Ltd., BCLRB Decision No.
B212/2006, [2006] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 212 (QL); Canadian Forest Products Ltd.,
BCLRB Decision No. B235/2006, [2006] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 238 (QL)).
60 HEABC Original Decision, supra note 58 at paras. 70, 72.
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The mischief that the Legislature was addressing was what in its
view was the Board's apparent reluctance to apply the purposes of
the Code with the vigour the Legislature thought they deserved. The
amendments were thus aimed at the decision makers under the Code
to direct them to apply those principles that were previously
expressed as purposes of the Code with a greater imperative. The
other persons must then be those who also engage in decision-
making under the auspices of the Code ... and anyone else who in
the narrow definition of duty exercises an office or discharges a
statutory function under the Code. It would not however, include the
parties under the Code .... 61
Nevertheless, the Section 2 duties may indirectly apply to parties, by
way of the decision makers' obligation to encourage cooperation by
parties and to consider the Code purposes:
[W]hether directly or indirectly, it is the parties who ultimately must
bear the burden of putting life into the Section 2 principles .... It is
at the very least the Board's duty to ensure that everyone governed
by the Code pays due regard to the principles enunciated in Section
2 by interpreting and applying the Code with that goal in mind.62
The Board has said that the parties "must also take an active role"
in fostering the Section 2 objectives before seeking intervention by
the Board. 63 The Board has concluded that, pursuant to Section 2, its
role is to assist parties in a variety of ways to work out issues
between them, and to encourage the parties to address the principles
61 Ibid. at para. 72.
62 HEABC Original Decision, supra note 58 at paras. 77, 80. On reconsideration,
the Board affirmed the general approach required by s. 2 outlined by the original
panel, stating: "[W]e agree with the original panel that the amended Section 2
puts greater emphasis on the Board to foster unions and employers considering
each others' perspectives and interests in the course of their decision-making ......
(HEABC Reconsideration, supra note 58 at para. 60).
63 Forest Industrial Relations Ltd. and Council offl. W.A. Locals, BCLRB Decision
No. B312/2003 at para 45, 100 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 65 [FIR]; Farmer Construction
Ltd. and B.C. Provincial Council of Carpenters, BCLRB Decision No.
B238/2004 at para 18, 108 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 185 (leave for reconsideration of




in Section 2,4 but that it must not intrude unnecessarily into parties'
self-governance.65
Therefore, it appears that process-orientation and traditional
interest in parties' self-government has not been compromised by
this aspect of the new Purpose Clause.
3. INTRODUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS:
SUBSECTION 2(A)
Contrary to some expectations, the Board's application and
interpretation of the new duty to recognize employee rights
(subsection 2(a)) has been measured, and the duty has been
interpreted in what could even be described as a collectivist rather
than an individualist manner. What has emerged as a key element of
recognizing employee rights is the right to free choice about union
representation. The Board has stated that employee choice is the
fundamental premise of the Code, and that subsection 2(a) reinforces
this.66 Consequently, this right is largely being used to reinforce the
protection of employees and their freedom to associate collectively
and choose union representation.6 7
4. FOSTERING EMPLOYMENT IN ECONOMICALLY VIABLE
BUSINESSES: SUBSECTION 2(B)
The effect of the newly introduced duty to foster the employment of
workers in an economically viable business (subsection 2(b)) has
also not been as negative as commentators feared. First, the Board
has clarified its interpretation of "economically viable", ruling that it
means more than "mere survival", "capable of living or existing",
yet that it does not mean "economically prosperous" either. Rather, it
64 FIR, ibid. at para. 47.
65 HEABC Original Decision, supra note 58 at paras. 77,80 (this view was affirmed
on reconsideration: HEABC Reconsideration, supra note 58 at para. 60).
66 Ledcor CMI Ltd., BCLRB Decision No. B229/2004 at para. 7, [2004]
B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 230 (QL) (leave denied for reconsideration of BCLRB
Decision No. 218/2004, [2004] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 219 (QL)).
67 Convergys Customer Management Canada Inc.and B.C.G.E.U (February),
BCLRB Decision No. B62/2003, 90 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 238 (leave for
reconsideration denied: BCLRB Decision No. B 111/2003, 90 C.L.R.B.R. (2d)
287) [Convergys]; British Columbia Corps. of Commissionnaires, BCLRB
Decision No. B396/2003, [2003] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 396 (QL).
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means "at least potentially, bettering the circumstances of the
employees, the union, and the employer.,
68
The Board has also has consistently, and in different contexts,
held that this duty must be read in harmony with, and be balanced
against, other Section 2 duties, particularly the subsection 2(c) duty
to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
between employers and trade unions as the freely chosen
representatives of employees, and the subsection 2(a) duty to
recognize the rights of employees, employers, and trade unions
under the Code.69 As is evident in the discussion that follows,
subsection 2(b) has not taken precedence over other duties in Board
decisions. Concerns about economic viability are treated as relevant,
but have not been the Board's primary concern and have not dictated
the outcomes of its decisions.
(a) Access to Representation
With the introduction of employee rights and the duty to foster
employment in economically viable businesses into the Purpose
Clause (subsections 2(a) and (b)) the effect on access to
representation, including bargaining unit definition and other
representation questions, could have been a substantial shift away
from access and collective rights and toward individual rights and
employers' interests in defining bargaining units and determining
representation questions. Although these duties, along with
minimizing the effects of labour disputes on third parties (subsection
2(e)) have frequently come into play as competing considerations in
representation matters, the Board has consistently emphasized the
facet of individual employee rights relating to the free choice of
representation (subsection 2(c)), and has consistently refused to
allow the subsection 2(b) concern for economically viable
workplaces to govern its decisions in representation matters.
68 West Shore Transport Ltd., BCLRB Decision No. B254/2006 at paras. 7, 17, 21,
[2006] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 254 (QL) (leave for Reconsideration denied: BCLRB
Decision No. B280/2006, [2006] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 280 (QL)) [West Shore].
69 See e.g. Interwrap Inc., BCLRB Decision No. B305/2003, [2003] B.C.L.R.B.D.
No. 305 (QL); Sodexho MS Canada Ltd. and H.E.U., BCLRB Decision No.
B349/2004, 109 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 54 [Sodexho]; Nanaimo Seniors Village
Partnership, BCLRB Decision No. B221/2005, [2005] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 221
(QL), leave for reconsideration denied: BCLRB Decision No. B221/2005, [2005]
B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 308 (QL).
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The Board clearly rejected the notion that subsection 2(b) alters
the balance between access to collective bargaining and industrial
stability that is a key criterion for determining bargaining unit
appropriateness, declaring that it is incorrect to equate industrial
stability with economic viability. 0 It has also confirmed that the
existing policy for determining appropriate bargaining units strives
to balance access to collective bargaining and industrial stability, and
that subsection 2(b) is simply one part of the equation for
determining appropriateness and cannot be considered in isolation:
The Purpose Clause must be read as a whole and in conjunction with
the other provisions in the Code.7'
Employers have also repeatedly challenged the "building-block"
approach to defining bargaining units,72 arguing that it is contrary to
subsection 2(a) because it interferes with employers' rights of free
association, violates the rights of non-union employees in the
workplace, and is also contrary to subsection 2(b) because it is more
difficult for an employer to negotiate an agreement for a smaller
rather than larger group of its workers, and because it allows a small
proportion of the workforce to unionize and possibly disrupt the
operation and work of non-union workers with a labour dispute.73
The Board rejected these arguments, concluding that these concerns
are fully answered by existing Code provisions and the power to
amend units, 74 and finding no threat to business viability."5
70 Aramark Canada Facility Services Ltd., BCLRB Decision No. B243/2004 at
paras. 86-88, [2004] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 244 (QL) (leave for reconsideration
denied: BCLRB Decision No. B75/2005, [2005] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 73 (QL))
[Aramark].
71 Vancouver Film School Ltd., BCLRB Decision No. B387/2002 at para. 86, 99
C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 34 [Film School Original Decision] (leave for reconsideration
and reconsideration, BCLRB Decision No. B291/2003, 99 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 61
[Film School Reconsideration]). Note that the original decision was set aside on
reconsideration without addressing s. 2.
72 See e.g. Film School Original Decision, ibid.; Aramark, supra note 70.
73 Film School Original Decision, supra note 71 at para. 54. This argument was
upheld on reconsideration although the original decision was overturned as the
original panel misapplied the "geographic separateness" aspect of the test for unit
appropriateness. Film School Reconsideration, supra note 71 at para. 3.
74 Film School Original Decision, supra note 71. at para. 86.
75 Ibid at paras. 22, 86.
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The Board has also held that, though employers have their own
interests to advance through representation votes (reflected in
subsections 2(a) and (b)), its main concern is conducting votes so
that employees have a fair opportunity to express their true wishes,
pursuant to the duty to encourage collective bargaining with unions
as the freely chosen representatives of employees (subsection 2(c)). 6
Further, declaring that Section 2 does not require it to "screen"
unions to ensure their views and positions benefit or are in harmony
with employers' political views or economic interests,7 the Board
rejected the argument that the subsection 2(b) duty to foster
employment in economically viable businesses rendered a union an
"inappropriate" bargaining agent where the union's political
activities and lobbying could harm the employers' business.7 8
(b) Unfair Labour Practices
Unfair labour practices ("ULPs"), particularly in the context of union
organizing, can pit the rights and interests of anti-union employers
and employees against those of unions and their supporters.
Consequently, the subsection 2(a) emphasis on employee rights had
the potential to affect the application of ULP prohibitions in a
manner allowing greater interference with unionization. The Board
has stated that the subsection 2(a) duty to recognize employee rights,
along with the subsection 2(c) duty and the subsection 4(1)
recognition of employee freedom to chose to join a union "define
employees' freedom of association and access to collective
bargaining as a fundamental premise of the Code" and, "given this
fundamental premise, the role of the unfair labour practice
provisions of the Code is to preserve employees' freedom of
76 Ledcor CMI Ltd., BCLRB Decision No. B306/2004 at para 35, [2004]
B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 307 (QL), leave for reconsideration: BCLRB Decision No.
B354/2004, [2004] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 355 (QL); remitted to the original panel
and upheld on reconsideration in Taseko Mining Ltd., BCLRB Decision No.
B48/2005, [2005] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 46 (QL)).




association."79 Consequently, the Board must consider allegations of
employer ULPs during organizing in light of these provisions."0
However, a series of earlier decisions dealing specifically with
employer communications during union organizing accorded less
weight to employee rights, concluding that amendments to the
employer free speech (section 8) and ULP provisions (section 6),
introduced at the same time as the new Purpose Clause, altered the
weight to be given to employees' and employers' rights in
employers' favour when it came to employer speech during
organizing." As a result, the expanded the scope of permissible
communications provided by the amendments to sections 6 and 8
were not to be limited by the duty to recognize employee rights. It
concluded that the legislature had made important judgments about
employees' abilities to make free choices and to assess employers'
attempts to influence their decisions, based on employees'
knowledge that employers will usually oppose unionization. 2
However, more recent decisions have taken a different approach
to employer communications, giving employees' rights and interests
a central role. In comments meant to provide additional guidance to
the amended speech and ULP provisions, the Board has recently
emphasized that employers must not be "disrespectful of the
employees and their right to a non-coercive work environment in
which to exercise their right of free choice."83
79 Convergys, supra note 67 at paras. 96-97. S. 4(1) of the Code, supra note 1,
provides: "Every employee is free to be a member of a trade union and to
participate in its lawful activities."
80 Convergys, ibid.
81 2002 Amendment Act, supra note 11, ss. 2-3; Convergys, ibid. at para. 98. S. 8 of
the Code, supra note 1, provides: "Subject to the regulations, a person has the
freedom to express his or her views on any matter, including matters relating to
an employer, a trade union or the representation of employees by a trade union,
provided that the person does not use intimidation or coercion".
82 Convergys, ibid. at para. 118. This approach was followed in subsequent cases.
See e.g. British Columbia Lottery Corp. and B.C.G.E.U., BCLRB Decision No.
B289/2003, 99 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 93 (leave for reconsideration, and decision
upheld in part, of BCLRB Decision No. B82/2003, 99 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 72).
83 Simpe "Q" Care Inc. andH.E.U, BCLRB Decision No. B 161/2007 at paras. 87-
88, 139 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 281 (leave for reconsideration of BCLRB Decision No.




The Board has interpreted the Purpose Clause in a manner strongly
supportive of parties' own arrangements, be they voluntary
recognition, settlement, or collective bargaining agreements, locating
the underlying rationale for this approach in the subsection 2(c) duty
to encourage collective bargaining. As well, the Board has found
such agreements consistent with and encouraged by the principles of
fostering co-operative participation between employers and unions,
and encouraging the expeditious resolution of disputes (subsections
2(d) and (e)), noting that these agreements also avoid the costs and
delay of litigation,84 and declaring that "upholding settlements is a
foundational principle of good labour relations policy. ' 85 All of this,
the Board says, dovetails with its policy to promote parties' self-
governance.86
The overall approach of the Board in such circumstances appears
to be one of supervision rather than intervention, consistent with its
stated policy of encouraging self-governance. For instance, it has
held that it will not scrutinize voluntary recognition agreements and
unit definitions, in particular, on the same standard as a certification
application, for to do so would curtail parties' flexibility, and the
Board prefers to defer to the parties' agreement.87
Similarly, the Board will not intervene to insulate parties from
market pressures and, instead, expects parties to "assume the
responsibility to respond to these challenges."88 For instance, the
Board refused to relieve a union from memoranda of agreement
signed under pressure of employer threats to contract out work,
concluding that such pressure is part of the ordinary course of
bargaining and the subsection 2(d) duty to encourage cooperative
participation between employers and trade unions in resolving
84 Kutzne and Sodexho MS Canada Ltd., BCLRB Decision No. B 174/2007 at para.
69, 144 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 257.
85 McDonald & Ross Construction Ltd. and UA., Local 170, BCLRB Decision No.
B228/2007 at para. 26, 149 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 228.
86 Ibid. at para. 27. See also Overwaitea Food Group v. United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 247, BCLRB Decision No.
B 117/2008 at para. 120,2008 CanLili 38943, [2008] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 117 (QL).
87 Ibid. at paras. 27-29.
88 Mainroad Holdings Ltd. and B.C.G.E.U., BCLRB Decision No. B37/2007 at
paras. 43--44, 132 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 175 [Mainroad]. See also FIR, supra note 63.
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workplace issues.8 9 The Board has also said it will not interfere in a
dispute where a party is simply dissatisfied with the terms of its
agreement, and is seeking outside interference to achieve what it had
not in bargaining. 90 It found this to be the case even where altering
the negotiated bargaining structure might further Section 2 goals
(such as subsections 2(b), (c), and (d)). 9'
(d) Strikes and Picketing
The Board has expressly held that the legislature did not intend the
new Purpose Clause-in particular protection of third parties and the
public interest, protection of employer rights, or obligations on
employers and employees-to alter the Board's existing treatment of
strikes. 92 Furthermore, it emphasized that the Code contains many
purposes, and the subsection 2(f) duty to minimize the effects of
disputes on third parties is only one of these purposes. To give it
precedence would deprive employees and unions of rights, and
would not further other purposes such as recognizing rights or
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining. 93
The Board has also used the new Purpose Clause to justify
denying an employer's attempt to restrict picketing, recognizing that
picketing has a legitimate and constructive function in the labour
relations system, and is thus consistent with the purpose of
promoting the process of collective bargaining (subsection 2(c)).
Further, the subsection 2(b) goal of promoting employment in
economically viable workplaces did not favour restricting picketing,
given the reasonable prospect that the employees would continue to
89 Mainroad, ibid. at para. 42.
90 Farmer Construction Ltd., BCLRB Decision No. B217/2004 at para. 69, 108
C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 161 (leave for reconsideration denied: Farmer Construction
Reconsideration, supra note 63).
91 Ibid. at paras. 65-69.
92 Victoria Times Colonist Group Inc. and C.E.P., Local 25-G, BCLRB Decision
No. B265/2005 at para. 25, 116 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 249 (leave granted but
reconsideration denied: BCLRB Decision No. B 168/2006, 126 C.L.R.B.R. (2d)
121).
93 Ibid. at para. 26. See also Pacific Newspaper Group Inc. and C.E.P., Local 2000.,
BCLRB Decision No. B129/2006, 124 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 85 (leave for
reconsideration: BCLRB Decision No. B264/2006, 127 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 313;
remitted to the original panel and upheld on reconsideration: BCLRB Decision
No. B24/2007, 132 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 109).
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work in the business in question. Consequently, the Board held that
the "collective bargaining process should be allowed to play itself
out."
94
(e) Duty of Fair Representation
The union's duty of fair representation to employees it represents is
an area where some of the most acute conflicts between the interests
of individual employees and those of the union lie. It is not
uncommon that promoting collective interests exacts a costly toll on
some individual employees. In these cases we might expect to find a
labour board to significantly restrict the wide discretion unions are
presently allowed over negotiating and administering collective
agreements, in favour of increasing protection for individual
employee rights. This could well have been one effect of the new
Purpose Clause.
Instead, the Board has held that an overbroad interpretation of
unions' duty towards individual employees would be detrimental to
the rights of employees because it would "undermine the union's
ability to control its resources and actions". 95 Here, the Board used
the Section 2 concern for individual employee rights and obligations
to reinforce the legitimate scope of union discretion in administering
a collective agreement, and interpreted individual employee rights in
what is a rather collectivist manner. Moreover, the Board looked not
only at rights, but also obligations under subsection 2(a), to conclude
that the duty of fair representation imposes obligations not only on
unions but also on employees: "Employees should be aware that
once [the Union's] obligations have been met, they too have an
obligation to carry on and act consistently with the principles
contained in Section 2 of the Code. 9 6
94 Trivern Enterprises Ltd. (Re), BCLRB Decision No. B397/2004 at para. 79,
[2004] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 398 (QL) (leave for reconsideration denied: BCLRB
Decision No. B76/2005, [2005] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 74).
95 Judd, supra note 54 at para. 90. See also Subotin, BCLRB Decision No.
B62/2007, [2007] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 62 (QL).




Unlike with previous purpose clauses, parties and the Board appear
to have embraced the new Section 2 duties clause. Since its
enactment, it has been argued and explicitly applied in numerous
Board decisions. However, the actual effect of the Purpose Clause
has not been as predicted. While the Purpose Clause had the
potential to significantly rebalance labour relations in favour of the
interests of individual employees, management and business
outcomes, diminishing the collective rights and process-orientations
of labour relations, this does not appear to have been the result.
Indeed, we've seen the Board using Section 2 to enhance and bolster
the traditional orientation of the labour relations regime. It is also
clear that the Board does not consider individual subsections of the
Purpose Clause in isolation, instead balancing individual duties or
objects against others.97
Is this a rogue Board resisting the will of the legislature, and an
example of ineffective political control over an agency? Or, as some
legislative theorists might contend, is it an example of dynamic
statutory interpretation by a tribunal fulfilling its role, reflecting its
own narrative, history, and understanding of the statute and Purpose
Clause? The next Part examines these questions.
III. LEGISLATIVE THEORY, ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS, AND THE PURPOSE CLAUSE
Given the Government's strong statements about its intentions in
introducing the Purpose Clause, the history of its dissatisfaction with
the Board's application of purpose clauses, and the contrary finding
that key dimensions of the labour relations system remained
unchanged by the Purpose Clause, this leads to the question of how
to characterize this phenomenon.
This Part of the article addresses these questions, looking to the
role and decision making of tribunals such as the Board, and
interpretive and legislative theory. It then examines the role of
purpose clauses, both generally and within administrative decision
making.





A purpose clause is a substantive provision located in the body of
legislation, commonly following the enacting clause. As such, and
even though purpose clauses are not a necessary element of
legislation, they are as binding as any other substantive provision in
the statute.98 Sullivan characterizes the function of the purpose
clause as identifying "legislative values" by setting out the
principles, policies or objective that the legislature wants to
implement or achieve with the statute. 99 Consequently, it can
influence and guide interpretation and understanding of the
legislation as a whole, and can define the limits of discretion the act
allows decision-makers or interpreters. ' In essence, the purpose
clause is the lens through which all other provisions are viewed.
Nevertheless, purpose statements seldom appear in Canadian
legislation, and are not even addressed in federal or provincial
interpretation acts. ' They are similarly scarce in labour legislation,
with only British Columbia and Ontario including purpose
statements in their collective bargaining statutes. 102
B. THE NATURE OF TRIBUNAL DECISION MAKING
The character and role of tribunals has consequences for the nature
of their decision making, which is also distinct. Statutory
interpretation and decision making by administrative tribunals differ
distinctly from that of courts, arising from their different capacities
for rule and policy-making and exercising discretion, the ongoing
rather than episodic nature of tribunal decision making, different
degrees of independence from political control and, as addressed in a
subsequent section, the potential-or perhaps inevitability-of
dynamic statutory interpretation.
98 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed.
(Markham, ON: Butterworths, 2002) at 300-301.
99 Ibid. at 300.
l0°Ibid, at 300-302; CAIMAW v. Paccar of Canada Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983 at
1028-1030, 62 D.L.R. (4th) 437 [Paccar].
101 Sullivan, supra note 98 at 300.
'02Code, supra note I at s. 2; Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, s. 2.
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1. DISCRETION IN DECISION MAKING
Courts and tribunals engage in different types of decision making,
reflecting the different functions and capacities of the two
institutions. Legislatures typically grant tribunals broad authority to
exercise discretion in interpreting and applying legislation. In
contrast, courts are not intended to engage in rule or policy-making,
chiefly because they are not meant to apply the degree of discretion
necessary for such decision making. 10 3 Instead, courts are
responsible for applying common law and interpreting statutes on a
textual, intentional, or purposive approach.'
2. ONGOING DECISION MAKING
A further defining feature of tribunal decision making is that it is an
experience of ongoing and integrated interpretation of relatively
indeterminate, or intransitive, statutes. 10 5 In contrast, judicial
1
0 3 Edward L. Rubin "Law and Legislation in the Administrative State" (1989) 89
Colum. L. Rev. 369 at 374, 385 [Rubin, "Law and Legislation"]. As discussed in
the next section, this institutional competency (as Rubin terms it) has implications
for the nature of legislation intended for primary interpretation by a tribunal
rather than courts. Sossin and Smith note that labour boards, in particular,
develop public policy (Lome Sossin & Charles Smith. The Independent Board&
The Legislative Process (June 2006), online: Alberta Federation of Labour
<http://www.afl.org/upload/sossinreport.pdf> at 13 [Sossin]. See also France
Houle & Lome Sossin, "Tribunals and guidelines: Exploring the between fairness
and legitimacy in administrative decision-making" (2006) 49:3 Canadian Public
Administration 282.
104Edward Rubin, "Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State"
(Article 2 of the Symposium on Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, November
2002), (2002) Issues in Legal Scholarship, online: The Berkeley Electronic Press
<http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art2> at 6 [Rubin, "Dynamic Interpretation"].
Rubin notes, in the U.S., the purposive approach is "somewhat exotic" and
remains controversial and, though applied, it was not really recognized prior to
Eskridge's article (at 6-7); See William N. Eskridge Jr., "Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation" (1986-1987) 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479. In contrast, the Supreme
Court of Canada has set forth the modem approach to statutory interpretation as,
essentially, a purposive approach: "Today there is only one principle or approach,
namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the
object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament." (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd.,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para. 21, 36 O.R. (3d) 418).
1
0 5Peter L. Strauss, "When the Judge is Not the Primary Official With
Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative
History" (1990) 66 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 321 at 321-322 [Strauss, "Judge"].
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decision making is characterized as episodic interpretation of
legislation of relatively determinate, or transitive, statutory text.'6
This continuing and integrated experience of decision making is,
itself, a significant influence on tribunal decision making and one
which Strauss identifies as possibly the greatest difference between
the judicial and tribunal forums. '07 Strauss likens the effect of this to
the different treatment given to relational and discrete contracts,
where the effects of a particular contract may not capture the entire,
intertwined and ongoing relationship between the parties, and
interpretation of a particular contract must take this relational
context into account.' Similarly, in many administrative law
settings, and certainly for labour relations matters, the particular
matter before the tribunal is only a single episode in the parties'
ongoing relationship. Effective resolution of that matter may depend
on taking the longer term view into consideration. 109
C. INDEPENDENCE AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL
In assessing the Board's treatment of the Purpose Clause, it is
helpful to first consider the Board's overall function and role as an
administrative tribunal and part of the machinery of the modem
regulatory state, which is characterized by its reliance on statutory
regulation and administrative agencies charged with interpreting and
applying this legislation.
1. INDEPENDENCE
Tribunals are not constitutionally distinct from the executive branch




109Labour boards have long emphasized their concern with the effect of the
resolution of an immediate dispute on the parties' long-term collective bargaining
relationship, and such considerations can strongly influence the board's treatment
of a particular matter. This is a central aspect of labour boards' "voluntaristic"
approach to regulating labour relations (H.D. Woods, Labour Policy in Canada,
2d ed. (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973) at 152.
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independence labour boards are entitled to in Canadian law.)' °
Administrative tribunals fall under the mandate of the legislature,
have a policy function, are funded by the executive, and may be
subject to policies, procedures, and practices established by the
executive."' Consequently, they are not entitled to the type of
absolute independence that is the hallmark of the judiciary.
Nevertheless, tribunals, and particularly those with substantial
adjudicative functions such as labour boards, may be entitled to
some degree of independence. 2 The nature of this independence,
though, is important to recognize: "[It] is not a protection of the
Board, it is, rather, a protection of those who come before the
Board."' 13
Furthermore, this is a common law rather than constitutional
protection, and the degree of independence applicable to a given
tribunal is determined by the legislature," 14 and involves a
contextual, and not categorical, analysis.' Being common law
independence, it can be restricted or modified by legislation.
1 6
Nevertheless, as Lome Sossin notes, this common law protection is
"modeled on the constitutional norm of judicial independence", 117
and the Supreme Court has indicated that courts will not "lightly
assume" that legislation interferes with independence." 8
I °Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control
and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52 at para. 24, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, 204
D.L.R. (4th) 33 [Ocean Port]; Sossin, supra note 103.
"'lOcean Port, ibid. at paras. 32, 23; Sossin, ibid. at 14. As the Supreme Court of
Canada explains, it is because implementation of government policy may require
a tribunal to make quasi-judicial decisions that tribunals "may be seen as
spanning the constitutional divide between the executive and judicial branches of
government." (Ocean Port, ibid. at para. 24). McLachlin C.J.C. states: "They
[tribunals] are, in fact, created precisely for the purpose of implementing
government policy" (at para. 24).
112 Ocean Port, ibid.; Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employers Assn., 2003
SCC 36 at para. 22, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884, 277 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Bell].
113Sossin, supra note 103 at 14.
114Ocean Port, supra note 110 at paras. 22-23.
115Bell, supra note 112 at para. 22.
116Sossin, supra note 103 at 14-15.
1171bid at 3.




Nonetheless, there is a strong, informal tradition of labour board
independence in Canada, demonstrated particularly by what has been
described as the "fiercely independent" B.C. Board. "' Though
Canadian labour boards have not always succeeded in avoiding--or
appearing to avoid-political influence in their decision making, it is
clear that this is a valued feature of our labour relations system. 120
Such traditions and expectations of board independence can be a
significant force in labour relations. '21 Sossin notes that tripartite and
relatively independent labour boards have become a fixture and a
counter-trend to government intervention in labour relations.' 2
3. CONTROL
The counterweight to tribunal independence is control. Political
control or oversight of agencies by the legislature and executive is a
well-studied phenomenon, and can operate overtly or implicitly, with
traditional forms of agency control by the legislature including both
statutory and non-statutory control techniques.'23  Statutory
techniques include drafting the tribunal's governing legislation such
that it specifies how the tribunal is meant to operate and decide
matters before it, or setting out precise prohibitions in the tribunals'
budget allocation. Non-statutory techniques include the use of
review committees, reports to the legislature, and public hearings. 24
119See Sossin, supra note 103 at 8-12. For a discussion and historical review of the
tradition of informal independence by Canadian labour boards, see Sossin, ibid.,
at 10-12, and Andrew C.L. Sims, "Reflections on Administering Labour Law"
(2005) 12 C.L.E.L.J. 121 at 123, 127.
120 See Sossin, ibid.; Kevin M. Burkett, "The Politicization of the Ontario Labour
Relations Framework in the 1990s" (1998) 6 C.L.E.L.J. 161; Judith McCormack,
"Comment on 'The Politicization of the Ontario Labour Relations Framework in
the 1990s"' (1999) 7 C.L.E.L.J. 325.
121See Sossin, ibid. at 10-11 for a discussion of the determination of chairs of the
Ontario and British Columbia Labour Relations Boards, in particular, to protect
and insulate their boards from government influence and intrusion.
1
22 Ibid. at 12.
123Strauss, "Judge", supra note 105; R. Douglas Arnold, "Political Control of




An alternative approach, using administrative rules and
procedures as tools of control, has also been recognized. 125 Arnold
identifies two types of such administrative rules and procedures:
broad procedural rules and policy-specific procedural innovations. 
126
Broad procedural rules, such as statutes dealing with the operation of
administrative tribunals, can have the effect of allowing external
forces to influence administrative processes. 127 In this way, it can
make administrative rulemaking more akin to legislative
lawmaking. 28 Meanwhile, policy-specific procedural innovations,
such as requiring environmental impact statements or government
funding of consumer advocates, are also not intended to be policy-
neutral. 29 Rather, they are intended to advance particular interests,
ensuring that they are not ignored, thereby altering the "balance of
political forces" influencing administrative officials. "designed to
advance interests that otherwise might be ignored." 130 Overall, such
control techniques operate by changing agencies' decision-making
environment so as to "limit an agency's range of feasible policy
actions",'"' "forc[ing] agencies to hear and consider the full range of
policy preferences that Congress itself would hear if it had retained
jurisdiction over these decisions."'
3 2
McCubbins et al. note that an interesting feature of procedural
controls is that they allow legislators to impose their preferences on
tribunals without needing to know or to dictate the precise outcome
that is most desirable to them:
The most subtle and, in our view, most interesting aspect of
procedural controls is that they enable political leaders to assure
compliance without specifying, or even necessarily knowing, what
substantive outcome is most in their interest. By controlling
125Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast "Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control" (1987) 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243.
126Arnold proposes these sub-categories of administrative rules used as instruments





131McCubbins, supra note 125 at 244.
132Arnold, supra note 123 at 281.
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processes, political leaders assign relative degrees of importance to
the constituents whose interests are at stake in an administrative
proceeding and thereby channel an agency's decisions toward the
substantive outcomes that are most favored by those who are
intended to be benefited by the policy. Thus, political leaders can be
responsive to their constituencies without knowing, or needing to
know, the details of the policy outcomes that these constituents
want. '33
Executive control, meanwhile, also includes the power to appoint,
renew (or not), or sometimes even terminate administrative officials.
With such actions, the executive can clearly communicate its
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with tribunal members' decision
making. It is easy to imagine that this can then influence tribunal
members' conduct.'34 Although such actions are often overt, this
power can also give rise to implicit pressure and control, such as
through political appointments made, as Strauss describes it "with an
eye to the appointee's program or likely approach, or of a successful
bureaucrat's intuitive knowledge what course of action will avoid
political reprisal or earn political credit."' 3 5
4. TENSION
As a result, one influence defining and distinguishing tribunal and
judicial decision making is the government and its policy agenda,
and the degree of political control the executive is entitled to
exercise over the tribunal. The consequence is that tribunals such as
labour boards operate subject to an imperfectly calibrated tension
between acting as an independent adjudicator, and a policy arm of
government. This is well-reflected in Sossin's description of the
labour board's role:
133McCubbins, supra note 125 at 244.
134In Ontario and British Columbia there have been a number of government
decisions and actions regarding labour board chairs and vice-chair that have
appeared to be responses to government dissatisfaction with decisions of
particular vice-chairs. The labour relations community (sometimes both
management and labour) branded this government action as improper
interference with the labour board (for Ontario see e.g. Burkett, supra note 120;
McCormack, supra note 120).
135Strauss, "Judge", supra note 105 at 332.
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Labour Boards perform adjudicative functions but do so in the
service of policy goals (the primary policy goal, however, remains
impartial and informal dispute-resolution based on expertise in
labour relations rooted in mutual acceptability of employer and
union groups). 136
D. THE NATURE OF TRIBUNAL LEGISLATION
The modem regulatory state is characterized by an abundance of
statutory regulation and administrative agencies charged with
interpreting and applying this legislation. As such it is a departure
from the earlier, common-law and court dominated legal world.'37
This departure, commentators contend, has necessary implications
for the shape of such statutes. This new environment demands a
different concept of law and of legislation to account for the
distinctions between administrative tribunals and courts in their
roles, and in their relationship to government.'38 This section
considers the nature of tribunal legislation and notions of transitivity
and goal or implementation-oriented legislation characterizing
tribunal legislation.
Courts and tribunals, as discussed above, engage in different
forms of decision making. As a result the character of legislation
directed at these two types of interpretive mechanisms, as Rubin
labels them, is also distinct. It is the two primary differences
between courts and administrative tribunals examined in the
previous section, their differing capacities for policymaking and
exercising discretion and their differing degrees of independence,
that ground necessary distinctions in legislation intended for each. "9
136Sossin, supra note 103 at 13. For an examination of the question of whether to
recognize quasi-judicial tribunals as part of the judicial branch of government,
and introducing structural independence, see S. Ronald Ellis, "The Justicizing of
Quasi-Judicial Tribunals, Part 1" (2006) 19 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 303 and S.
Ronald Ellis, "The Justicizing of Quasi-Judicial Tribunals, Part II" (2007) 20
Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 69.
137Rubin, "Law and Legislation", supra note 103; Strauss, "Judge", supra note 105;
Peter L. Strauss, "Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on
Rubin" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 427 [Strauss, "Legislative Theory"].




Rubin identifies several dimensions on which statutes may differ.
Most centrally, for this study, is the degree of intransitivity of the
legislation, and whether the legislation is goal- or implementation-
oriented. Intransitivity is addressed first, then the orientation of
statutes.
1. INTRANSITIVE DIRECTION TO TRIBUNAL
The "degree of transitivity" of a statute refers to how specifically the
legislature identifies in the statute the rule it expects the decision-
maker to apply. 140 Highly transitive legislation sets out specific rules
and, as described by Rubin, is characterized by containing rules that
are "typically ... stated with sufficient precision so that they can be
used as rules of conduct by private persons, and so that society is
justified in visiting unpleasant consequences on those who fail to
comply."''
At the other end of the spectrum is highly intransitive legislation,
which just directs the decision-maker to develop rules. As Rubin
points out, such legislation primarily speaks to the decision-maker
rather than the public because "until the mechanism acts, the
ultimate target of the statute cannot know what behaviour the statute
will require."' 42
Transitivity of legislation can also be regarded as "the extent to
which the statutory directive ... is intended to pass through the
primary implementation mechanism and apply to its ultimate
target."' 43 As such, transitive statutes are directed primarily at the
parties that are the object of the legislation, while relatively
intransitive statutes speak primarily to the interpretive mechanism or
decision-maker. Therefore, the degree of transitivity in a statute
reflects the decision-maker's capacity for adjudication or discretion.
Most simply, transitive statutes are described as demanding
adjudication, while intransitive ones require rulemaking. '44
'Ibid. at 381.
14 Ibid. at 381, 385.
1





It is important to note that "[s]tatutes can be intransitive with
respect to either their application or their elaboration."' 45 Regarding
transitivity of application, a statute is intransitive if it states no rule,
simply directing the decision-maker to develop rules to apply; but is
transitive if it specifies "at least some rules" that the decision-maker
is to apply directly to the target of the legislation. 146
Statutes that are transitive in application do, however, vary in
their degree of transitivity of elaboration. Therefore, in order to
assess the overall transitivity of statutes that are transitive in
application it is also necessary to consider how the statutory rules are
to be elaborated. 147 If, for instance, the express rule is set out in
broad terms, then the overall character of the legislation will be
intransitive, even though it contains an explicit rule to be applied
directly to the target. 148
Statutes containing express rules the decision-maker is to apply
directly to the target and, therefore, being transitive in application,
may be rendered overall intransitive in nature because of the way
these rules must be elaborated. 149 For instance, a statute may include
express rules but may not be specific about the content of the rules.
Similarly, a statute may set out a number of precise rules, but also
give the decision-maker authority to make additional rules, or leaves
gaps in the rules for the decision-maker to use its discretion to fill. 0
In this way, what may first appear to be transitive statutes can be
converted to intransitive ones.
The notion of intransitivity is also relevant to the application or
elaboration of the statute. 151 Transitivity in application refers to
whether or not the statute states the rule the agency is to apply
directly to the legislation's target. A statute that is highly intransitive
in its application does not state the rule that the tribunal is to apply.













the other end of the scale, highly transitive statutes state rules in very
specific, precise terms and, as Rubin describes it, they are "intended
to pass through the primary implementation mechanism and apply to
its ultimate target."' 5 3 Such rules require little interpretation,
discretion, or policy-making. 1
5 4
Transitivity in elaboration refers to how broadly or narrowly the
rule is stated, and so requiring more or less elaboration by the
tribunal. This is crucial, as Rubin points out that this can define the
overall, effective character of the legislation and can even transform
a transitive statute into one that is, in effect, intransitive. "'
In Rubin's view (though he acknowledges that there is
disagreement about the appropriate or actual degree of judicial
discretion)'56 the lack of discretion courts are legitimately able to
apply has implications for the type of legislation that they are best
suited to interpreting and applying. ' Rubin suggests that courts are
suited to highly transitive statutes. In contrast, and as discussed
earlier, administrative tribunals are created for the very purpose of
policy-making and exercising discretion'58 and, as a result, are suited
to intransitive legislation. '9
The overall degree of intransitivity determines the basic stance of
the implementation mechanism, and the degree of discretion, rule,
and policy making it will likely engage in. Thus, where a statute has
both transitive and intransitive features, then the overall character of
the legislation will be a matter of degree. For instance, where the
statute sets out specific rules directed at the target, but the rules are
relatively broadly stated (that is, it is transitive in applicability but
intransitive in elaboration), then some degree of rule-making will
occur. 160
153Ibid
154Rubin allows that "There is probably no such thing as a totally transitive rule,
however, since all rules, no matter how precise, raise some interpretive problems




158Ocean Port, supra note 110 at para. 24; Bell, supra note 112.




2. ORIENTATION: GOALS AND IMPLEMENTATION
Consistent with regarding statutes as "directives issued to
implementation mechanisms", Rubin contends that a legislature's
objective of reaching a particular outcome can be realized by two
different, intransitive, statutory approaches: what he terms 'goal-
oriented' and 'implementation-oriented' legislation. 
61
Goal-oriented legislation "simply enact[s] its goal as law,"
instructing the decision-maker to produce the desired outcomes,
perhaps supplemented with non-binding suggestions or subsidiary
provisions setting out possible means for the implementation
mechanism to achieve the goal. 162 Such legislation is intransitive
because it relies on the decision-maker to devise the rule that will be
applied. 1
63
Rubin identifies several potential advantages to goal-oriented
legislation. First, including what Rubin labels a "goal statement" in a
statute may be "the most effective way [for the legislature] to
exercise purposive control over an implementation mechanism.""64
In particular, such specified goals can be used as readily available
performance criteria that the legislature can use to control a
tribunal. 165 Second, using goal-oriented legislation may be more
effective at realizing the legislator's goals than clear rules. It relieves
the legislature from the responsibility and difficulty of defining rules
and implementation strategies which, as Rubin notes, may involve
complicated issues requiring empirical data. 166 Moreover, because
such legislation necessarily draws on the expertise, experience, and
discretion of the interpreter, it has the advantage of being able to
adapt to changing circumstances and experience, which inflexible
transitive rules do not. '67
Alternatively, a legislature could take a more process-oriented
approach using implementation-oriented legislation. In this type of
legislation, the statute specifies implementation processes, such as
1
6 1Ibid. at 409-410.





1671bid. at 414 [footnotes omitted].
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techniques or strategies, for the tribunal to follow when applying the
legislative rule.'68 This type of statute is intransitive because it
provides the decision-maker with directions that are supplementary
to the actual rule. 1
69
Rubin notes that this type of legislation is directed at the tribunal
itself, in order to achieve control over the tribunal's behaviour, and
is not directed at citizens or the broader community. 7 ° Such
legislation embodies a particular perspective of the tribunal's role,
treating it as "a crucial component of the implementation process"
rather than "a transparent medium through which a statute is
transmitted to the populace."" 1' Implementation-oriented legislation
may also be effective at achieving the legislature's desired outcomes
and political control of the decision-maker. '72 However, it has the
weakness, compared to goal-oriented legislation, of requiring that
the legislature correctly predict the effect of the rule and mandated
implementation mechanism. Otherwise, such legislation can produce
undesirable outcomes.
E. DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Administrative tribunals are recognized to (and, in Rubin's view,
must) engage in what William Eskridge terms "dynamic statutory
interpretation". "' Eskridge's thesis is that interpretation of a statute
may change over time such that it departs farther and farther from
the enacting legislature's interpretation of the statute.' 74 Social,
1
68Ibid. at 418, 410. Rubin notes that this is "specification of a different sort





173 William Eskridge elaborated on his classic article (supra note 104) in his book
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004)) [Eskridge,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation]; Rubin, "Dynamic Interpretation", supra note
104.
174Eskridge, "Dynamic Statutory Interpretation", ibid. at 5-6. Eskridge explicitly
drew on several intellectual traditions to develop this theory and to explain
dynamic statutory interpretation, including pragmatism, hermeneutics, and
positive political theory (at 80).
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economic, political, and legal contexts are all potential influences
driving this dynamism. 175A statute may also be applied dynamically
from the outset, perhaps because the statute contains unresolved,
suppressed, overlooked, or unanticipated issues, or perhaps because
the tribunal's ideology differs from that of those who enacted the
statute. 176 Furthermore, statutes can even be "doubly dynamic": not
only may the decision-maker be interpreting it dynamically, but the
legislature can "rewrite statutes when it disagrees with the way they
are interpreted."' 177 As Eskridge describes it:
[S]tatutory policy is often doubly dynamic: agencies and courts
attend to current as well as historical congressional preferences
when they interpret statutes, and when they fail to attend
perceptively enough, Congress often rewrites the text to reflect
current values. 1
78
Though Eskridge mainly had courts in mind when developing the
notion of dynamic statutory interpretation, Rubin contends that
dynamic statutory interpretation not only better describes
administrative tribunal decision making, but that "the institutional
realities of agency interpretation virtually command dynamic
statutory interpretation." 179 Furthermore, (as addressed earlier) the
intransitive character of legislation governing administrative
tribunals allows more scope for dynamic interpretation because of its
relatively indeterminate nature.
1. DRIVERS OF DYNAMIC DECISION MAKING
Labour board decision making is influenced by complicated
relationships among the political branches of government (the
executive and the legislature), courts and the board, and between the
board and its constituency, the labour relations community. These
175Rubin, "Dynamic Interpretation", supra note 104 at 1.
176Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 173 at 51, 77. Eskridge
notes "Dynamic statutory interpretation can occur immediately after a law's
enactment.., because the ideology of the implementing agency may be different
from that of the enacting coalition" (at 77 [footnotes omitted]).
177Ibid.at 7.
1781bid.
179Rubin, "Dynamic Interpretation", supra note 104 at 4.
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external and internal factors are potential drivers for dynamic
statutory interpretation. 0
(a) External Sources of Dynamism: the Context of Decision
Making
Two important sets of external influences are recognized as
pressures that administrative tribunals, such as labour boards,
experience from both "above" and "below".' 8 Judicial, legislative,
and political oversight of the labour board, as well as the indirect
influence of public pressure on government, are external forces
acting on tribunals from above. 82 These pressures encourage the
tribunal to respond to what Eskridge describes as "current rather than
historical political preferences" in its decision making.'83
i. Pressure from Above
The influence and supervision of the courts over tribunals such as
the Board is limited and relatively clear. Tribunals are overseen by
the courts, through the mechanism of judicial review. 184 However,
reviewing courts generally allow tribunals a high degree of
deference,' 85 and labour statutes in Canadian jurisdictions (and B.C.
in particular) contain strong privative clauses limiting the scope for




'8 2As Strauss notes, this can be viewed as a series of principal-agent problems
(Strauss, "Legislative Theory", supra note 137). Eskridge describes this as
pressure on the tribunal from above and below (Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 173 at 49).
183Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, ibid.
184Strauss, "Judge", supra note 105 at 333 notes that agencies are subject to both
political and court oversight.
185Note that judicial review of labour relations boards is relatively uncommon. In
B.C., particularly, this may be due to the relatively expansive reconsideration
jurisdiction of the Board (Code, supra note 1, s. 141). Also note that the Supreme
Court of Canada has recently redefined the standard of judicial review for
administrative tribunals, eliminating the concept of "patently unreasonable" with
two standards of review remaining: correctness or unreasonableness. It indicated
that adjudication in labour law would generally be subject to the reasonableness
standard, depending on the nature of the question at issue (Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] S.C.R. 190, 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577).
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judicial review.' 86 Consequently, judicial oversight of labour
tribunals likely has little influence on these tribunals' decision
making and interpretive approach on a day-to-day basis.
Legislative oversight and control is potentially much more
meaningful since tribunals are subject to the direction of the
legislature to the extent that they are subject to applicable legislation,
and appointments and re-appointments to the tribunal are controlled
by the legislature. Procedural or substantive changes to the home
statute or ancillary legislation governing the tribunal can
significantly affect tribunals' operation and decision making, altering
their jurisdiction and, therefore, the scope of judicial review.'87
Exercise of legislative control is often concerned with the tribunal's
responsiveness to current political preferences and, simply put, a
legislature can change a statute if it objects to the tribunal's
interpretation, or if it finds that the legislation doesn't satisfy current
political values. 88 This is what Eskridge terms "legislative
feedback".'89 Because of the high degree of control that the
executive exercises over the legislature in Canadian governments,
the goals of legislative control are often indistinguishable from those
of political control.' 90
Less well defined is the legitimate role of politics and the degree
of direct influence or control the executive has over tribunals. As
discussed earlier, tribunals are created to implement government
policy and, so, function as a policy arm of the government. As such
they are legitimately subject to the oversight and control of the
executive branch. Though the necessary degree of independence for
186See e.g. Code, supra note 1, s. 138.
187See e.g. the Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45, or the
Administrative Tribunals Appointment and Administration Act, S.B.C. 2003, c.
47.
188Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 173 at 47, 49.
1
89 Ibid. at 47.
190 This influence of the Legislature is qualified by the potential for executive
"capture" of the legislature in majority governments, and Donald Savoie argues
that both the legislature and cabinet are institutions that are being bypassed by the
executive, and that effective government power is exercised by the Leader of the
Executive and his "courtiers". Savoie's observations were made about the federal
Canadian government, but similar arguments could be made about provincial
governments (Donald S. Savoie, "The Rise of Court Government in Canada"
(1999) 32:4 Canadian Journal of Political Science 635).
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labour boards is not yet certain, a high degree of governmental and
political control and oversight is possible, and may be legitimate. 9'
An ongoing dilemma for government is that once it delegates
decision-making authority to an administrative tribunal, it then has
the challenge of finding some way to regulate that decision-
making. 192 The government will likely be sensitive to pressure from
the public arising from tribunal decision-making which, in turn, will
likely influence government efforts to control or influence the
tribunal.
ii. Pressure from Below: Constituency Pressures
Both government and tribunals are also subject to pressure from
"below" from their constituents. Governments are sensitive to
voters' demands and frequently labour issues (and by extension
labour board performance) are hot-button political and election
issues, with the result that these demands can influence the
executive's dealings with labour boards.
At the same time, the labour board's own constituents-the
labour relations community-pressure the board to make decisions
that respond to the community's new and developing circumstances
and needs,' 93 and the community's reliance on the tribunal's
interpretations,1 94 in what Eskridge terms a "hydraulic process of
feedback and anticipation".' 95 The pressure of this community can
compel the tribunal in a different direction from-and possibly
counter to-the political influence applied by the government.
Pressure from the agency's constituency may be a more immediate
and effective influence compared to the relatively remote pressures
from government and courts. This is the community the tribunal
members are immersed in daily, and is often (particularly with
expert tribunals) the community that they come from and will likely
return to.
191See Sossin, supra note 103.






(b) Internal Sources of Dynamism
Eskridge also recognizes sources of dynamism that are internal to the
interpreting body, such as its own perspective, culture, history, and
tradition. In particular, pressures can arise where the perspective of
the interpreter differs from that of drafter, arising from different
"assumptions and beliefs about society, values, and the statute
itself'. '96 Such disjunction encourages dynamism,'97 and this effect
can be magnified where the statute contains unresolved or
suppressed issues that the legislature has, effectively, left the tribunal
to sort out.' 98
Labour boards are likely to have their own traditions and
understanding not only of the statute, but of the role of labour boards
as independent (in fact if not in law), relatively apolitical institutions,
whose true mandate is to foster constructive labour relations without
political or government interference.
As a result administrative tribunals, and certainly labour boards,
operate "in the world of politics as well as that of law .... 199
Therefore, it may well be that a tribunal, acting properly, will
interpret and apply legislation in a manner not in accordance with
the legislature's intention. Consequently, in assessing a tribunal's
treatment of legislation, we must do so in light of the nature of
administrative tribunal decision-making, and not apply inapt judicial
standards.
F. ASSESSING AND EXPLAINING THIS PHENOMENON
The government likely had several objectives in mind in introducing
this new Purpose Clause. First, the enacting government came to
power with a new agenda under which it planned substantial
reforms, including reforming labour relations in the province. A
purpose clause is a substantive, binding part of the Code, and the
amendment to the introductory portion of the provision, stating that
the "the board and other persons who exercise powers and perform
duties under this Code must exercise the powers and perform the
duties in a manner that" meets specified purposes, reinforces this
'96Ibid. at 58.
'97Ibid. at 11, 49.
198 Ibid. at 49.
199Strauss, "Judge", supra note 105 at 329.
2009
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
with its mandatory language. Further, as Adams noted, a preamble is
potentially a powerful tool for reorienting labour legislation.00
Therefore, the government clearly viewed the purpose clause as a
potentially effective means to reorient labour relations and redirect
Board decisions in line with the government's view of labour
relations.
As noted earlier, the Board has long been criticized as not giving
sufficient regard to the direction provided by the statute's purpose
clause. This criticism has come from government as well as the
labour relations community. Therefore, amending the purpose clause
provided the government with an opportunity to show the public and
its constituents that it was addressing the perceived Board
misconduct. The purpose clause speaks directly, in greatest part, to
the Board, directing its process and interpretation of the balance of
interests inherent in the Code. Perhaps more importantly, it allowed
the government to explicitly recognize individual and business
interests, and to demonstrate a commitment to these interests and
constituents perceived to have been under-served by past Board
decisions. At the same time, it explicitly located responsibility for
protecting these interests onto the Board and, therefore, away from
government.
There are clear indications that the new Purpose Clause was not
directed at the populace or the labour relations community but,
rather, to the Board itself. Even the Board has explicitly recognized
that it was the target that the purpose clause amendments were aimed
at, acknowledging:
The mischief that the Legislature was addressing was what in its
view was the Board's apparent reluctance to apply the purposes of
the Code with the vigour the Legislature thought they deserved. The
amendments were thus aimed at the decision makers under the Code
to direct them to apply those principles that were previously
expressed as purposes of the Code with a greater imperative.20'
Clearly the legislature was trying to "generate particular
behaviour" by the Board, as Rubin would describe it: making it more
self-conscious about its decision-making, and "bring[ing] the agency
into view as a crucial component of the implementation process." 
202
2°°Adams, "New Vitality", supra note 34 at 157, 170.
2 0 1HEABC Original Decision, supra note 58 at para. 72.
202Rubin, "Law and Legislation", supra note 103 at 418-419.
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Applying Rubin and others' analyses of tribunal decision-making
and statutory taxonomy to the new Purpose Clause can help
illuminate the intended-or even accidental-function and role of
this provision.
By its very nature as an expert tribunal charged with adjudicating
the full spectrum of labour relations matters, the Board must apply
expertise and discretion in its decision-making. Moreover, the
Board's experience of decision-making is very much one of ongoing
interpretation of the Code. This arises not only from the types of
matters falling under the Board's responsibility, but the long-
standing conception of labour boards' regulation of labour relations
as an ongoing relationship between the parties governed by
voluntary principles, with discrete matters coming before the Board
regarded as a single episode in a continuing relationship.
The Purpose Clause is a highly intransitive legislative provision.
Although it specifies a number of goals and mechanism that it
directs the Board to "recognize", "foster", "encourage", "promote",
"minimize", and "ensure", it does not set out specific rules for the
Board to apply. The Purpose Clause does not make it clear to the
targets of the legislation---employer, unions, and individual
employees-what behaviour the statute requires. Therefore, it meets
Rubin's description of a highly intransitive provision.23 This is not
surprising as a purpose clause, by its very nature, is likely to have a
high degree of intransitivity because a purpose clause has no
independent application. Its role is as a supplementary guide to
interpreting and applying the rest of the statute. As such it would be
difficult to envision a highly transitive purpose clause.
Applying Rubin's categorization of intransitive statutory
approaches, examining the Purpose Clause reveals that it embodies
both a goal-oriented and, to a lesser degree, implementation-oriented
approach. Though we might expect a provision titled a "purpose" or
"duties" clause to be goal-oriented-and a few specific duties appear
to be goals-a more careful look suggests that it is also process- and
implementation-oriented. Indeed, the following passage from an
early decision has come to be known as setting out the new "analytic
203This discussion relates to the Purpose Clause, specifically. However, the Code, as
a whole, is relatively intransitive, containing many clearly intransitive provisions
such as ULP and duty to bargain in good faith provisions which simply state
goals or broadly expressed rules. The Code also contains transitive elements,
such as the highly procedural union certification provisions (Code, supra note I ).
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framework" introduced by the new purpose clause indicates that the
Board itself regards the purpose clause as both goal- and
implementation-oriented:
Section 2 sets out a vision of labour relations which: describes the
goals of the system to the immediate parties; places those goals
within a larger, societal context; and emphasizes the mechanisms by
204which to proceed towards those goals ....
In addition to expressly reaffirming recognition of certain rights and
obligation contained in the Code-those of employers, unions, and
employees (subsection 2(a)), and the employees' right to freely
chose union representation (subsection 2(c))-the Purpose Clause
identifies several express goals and implementation mechanisms.
The Purpose Clause clearly sets out the following as outcome
goals: fostering employment in economically viable businesses
(subsection 2(b)); promoting conditions favourable to the orderly,
constructive and expeditious settlement of disputes (subsection 2(e));
minimizing effects of disputes on third parties (subsection 2(o); and,
protecting the public interest during disputes (subsection 2(g)). It
also identifies the following processes to be followed by the Board
in applying the Code: use of collective bargaining (subsection 2(c));
cooperative participation, which the Board has described as
identifying "the Code's preference as to how the employer and the
union are to meet the challenges they face" (subsection 2(d));2 5 and
mediation (subsection 2(h)).
It is evident that the Board faces myriad external and internal
pressures encouraging dynamic interpretation of the Code, including
the Purpose Clause, As discussed earlier, the Board has a
traditionally keen sense of independence, a broad reconsideration
jurisdiction, and a strong privative clause. These features all serve to
moderate the effects of external pressures on Board decision-making
such as judicial, legislative, and political supervision. However, the
province's history of frequent and significant changes to labour
legislation and occasional non-renewals of Board appointments-all
viewed as politically-motivated--do provide some external pressure
"from above" on Board decision-making.
204Judd, supra note 54 at para. 18.
20 51bid. at paras. 18, 21.
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Likely more influential, however, are external pressures from
"below"--the labour relations community, which is the Board's
constituency-and internal dynamic factors. Labour relations in the
province are noted for being particularly vital-if not contentious-
and the community is relatively small and has a great deal of
interaction within itself and with the Board. By the very nature of the
matters the Board deals with, parties who come within the Code's
regulation have repeated interaction with the Board and with each
other. In a larger sense the Board has a role in managing parties'
labour relations over time. Furthermore, the Board is made up of
lawyers, labour relations practitioners, unionists, and businesspeople
from the labour relations community. By the nature of Board
appointments, the expectation and experience is that Board members
eventually return to the community to resume their previous roles or
take on new ones such as arbitrator. As a result, the Board is highly
immersed in its community and likely feels far more acute and
immediate pressure from it than from any external source.
Internal dynamic pressures include the Board and its members'
own understandings of not only the Code, but the broader labour
relations scheme and culture and the lessons drawn from their own
labour relations experience. It may well be the case that their
understandings differ markedly from those of the legislators.
Both external pressures from the community and internal
pressures faced by this Board are likely intensified by its traditional
independence and strong sense of identity, stemming in large part
from its original, bold, conception and mandate to be the sole
institution dealing with all labour relations matters in a holistic
manner, even assuming exclusive responsibility for matters that had
previously been (and in other provinces remain) within the authority
of the courts.
These drivers of dynamism, combined with the high degree of
discretion the Board exercises, the Board's independence, the
ongoing nature of its decisions and the matters coming before it, and
the overall highly intransitive and goal-oriented nature of the
Purpose Clause, provide ideal circumstances for dynamic
interpretation of the new purpose clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this article applies analyses of administrative tribunals
and legislative theory to explore the experience with the Purpose
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Clause in B.C. labour relations legislation. This new Purpose Clause
arose out of government criticism that the Board had failed in the
past to give adequate regard to the Code's purpose clause and out of
the government's determination that the Board would now do so.
The purpose clause was converted to a "duties" clause containing a
mandatory direction to the Board to act consonant with the
articulated purposes, and two new purposes were added. Contrary to
expectations that this purpose clause would significantly change the
direction of Board decisions and, therefore, labour relations in the
province, review of the first five years of Board decisions under the
Purpose Clause concludes, in Part I of this article, that it had little
discernable effect on the labour relations system. The key features of
the established balance of power, collective rights orientation, and
process- rather than outcome-orientation remain unaltered.
This raises the question of how to properly assess this result
experience. Is it, on the one hand, a rogue Board which is once again
resisting the legislature's direction, and an example of ineffective
political control over an administrative tribunal, as the government
and some commentators might suggest? Or, is it more properly
characterized as an example of a tribunal engaging in legitimate
dynamic statutory interpretation of the purpose clause, as Rubin and
Eskridge might argue?
The preceding review suggests that the latter is a more accurate
explanation. A highly expert tribunal such as the Board, granted
broad jurisdiction, with a tradition of independence, and that is
deeply embedded in the labour community, combined with a highly
intransitive and largely goal-oriented piece of legislation such as the
new purpose clause, is a recipe for dynamic statutory interpretation.
Consequently, rather than tribunal misconduct, a fairer interpretation
of the Board's treatment of the Purpose Clause is that of an
administrative tribunal fulfilling its role by exercising its discretion
to reflect its own narrative, understanding, and history of the statute
and labour relations system as a whole, in its decisions to
dynamically interpret the new Purpose Clause.
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